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Title: Globalization, uneven development and the North-South  ?ďŝŐƐǁŝƚĐŚ ? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
An ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ‘ďŝŐƐǁŝƚĐŚ ?ŝŶĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŶĚĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŽǀĞƌ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐ
occurred since the turn of the Millennium. Economic globalization was formerly widely identified as 
being orchestrated in the interests of the global North. Sceptics, mostly left-leaning, expressed 
particular concern for its impacts in the global South. However, a recent backlash against 
globalization has emerged within the global North from the political right, while support for 
globalization has been expressed within ƚŚĞŐůŽďĂů^ŽƵƚŚ ?dŚŝƐ ‘ďŝŐƐǁŝƚĐŚ ?ĚĞĨŝĞƐŵĂŶǇƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů
predictions, and can be situated in relation to a shifting geography of global uneven development. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
[T]he rules of the game have been largely set by the advanced industrial countries ?  and 
particularly by special interests within those countries ? and, not surprisingly, they have 
shaped globalization to further their own interests. They have not sought to create a fair set 
of rules, let alone a set of rules that would promote the well-being of those in the poorest 
countries of the world. 
 
Joseph Stiglitz (2006, 4) 
 
If we step back from a US perspective, step back actually from an OECD perspective, and 
take a ruthless cosmopolitan, global perspective, then this hyperglobalization thing has been 
ĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĚŝďůĞĨŽƌĐĞĨŽƌŐŽŽĚĂŶĚŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚũƵƐƚŚŝŶĂ ? ? ?ŶĚǇĞƚ ?ĐĂŶǇŽƵŝŵĂŐŝŶĞƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽ
run a US national campaign saying, look, we know that a bunch of you guys, your 
communities are being gutted, but we gotta keep these markets open for the sake of the 
ƉĞŽƉůĞŽĨĂŶŐůĂĚĞƐŚ ?^Ž ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁŚŽǁǁĞĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚƚ Ăƚ ?ĂŶĚŝƚ ?Ɛ ?/ƌĞĂůůǇũƵƐƚĚŽŶ ?ƚ
know the answer to that. 
 
Paul Krugman, pĂŶĞůŽŶ “Trade, Jobs and Inequality ?, City University of New York, 
26th April 2017. 
 
 
The US, and to a lesser extent the UK and other OECD countries, have long been recognized 
as the chief architects and beneficiaries of economic globalization. Their political influence was 
represented through their dominant roles in organisations such as the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), or World Trade Organisation (WTO), as well as in the corporate dominance of 
their multinational companies conjured by images such as McWorld. This provoked a backlash from 
the political left in the 1990s, variously known as anti-/alter-globalization, which opposed deepened 
economic integration for its supposed deleterious impacts on countries and people in the global 
South. Protestors famously disrupted the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Ministerial Conference in 
Seattle in 1999. Joseph ^ƚŝŐůŝƚǌ ?ƐƋƵŽƚĞĂďŽǀĞ is indicative of critiques of globalization that infused 
the rhetoric of the alter-globalization movement into the early 21st century. A more extreme 
position was advanced by Walden Bello (2000, 2002), who argued for the dismantling of the World 
Bank and IMF ?dŚĞƐĞĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞĐƌŝƚŝĐƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂůƐƉĂĐĞ ?ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ
to countries in the global South was shrinking (Wade, 2003), as financial crises rippled across East 
Asia and Latin America in the late 20th century. Poverty persisted in South Asia and sub-Saharan 
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Africa and many governments were forced to devote significant resources to service debt. 
Meanwhile, the US seemed entrenched as the sole hyperpower in the post-Cold War world order, 
and it aspired to shape a new American century.   
Fast-forward to the quote of another Nobel Laureate, Paul Krugman, in April 2017 and 
globalization appears to be in an intractable crisis. ^ƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ƐĞǆŝƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
hŶŝŽŶƐĞĞŬƚŽ ‘ƚĂŬĞďĂĐŬĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? (i.e. developmental space) ĨƌŽŵƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ?ǁŚŝůĞŽŶĂůĚdƌƵŵƉ ?Ɛ
economic ethno-ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵŚĂƐƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĚƚŽƉƵƚ ‘ŵĞƌŝĐĂĨŝƌƐƚ ?. Meanwhile, economic and political 
crises have engulfed other parts of Europe, with the IMF increasingly rescuing countries in the global 
North rather than the South. The backlash against economic globalization has come from 
discontents in the global North, and on the right of the political spectrum (Stiglitz, 2017). In this 
context of political reversal and economic uncertainty, it may appear that globalization is in crisis, 
particularly when viewed from the backyards of its chief 20th century proponents. The World Bank 
struggles to maintain its relevance (Kanbur, 2017). To top off the sense of changed times, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping has stated that China will assume the leadership of 21st century globalization. 
In this article we present evidence of this apparent  ‘ďŝŐƐǁŝƚĐŚ ?ŝŶĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ and dominant 
discourse, which has occurred since the 1990s. The primary opposition to globalization then 
emanated from the political left and was concerned with its impacts in the global South. In contrast, 
in recent years the backlash has shifted and is now firmly rooted in the global North and on the 
political right. We argue that a ŬĞǇĨĂĐƚŽƌƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ďŝŐƐǁŝƚĐŚ ?ŝƐthe contrasting fortunes for 
many people in the global North and global South. The geography of uneven development has 
evolved in ways which defy the predictions of both the most vocal proponents and critics of 
globalization in the late 20th century. In the following sections, we highlight two contrasting 
theoretical perspectives on the outcomes of globalization (section two), before outlining arguments 
that supported late 20th century globalisation and its discontents (section three). We then chart the 
current backlash against, and also the continued support for, contemporary globalization (section 
four). In section five we discuss factors which may underlie the big switch, before section six 
concludes. 
 
2. Economic globalization and uneven development 
 
Economic globalization is typically understood as the increasing integration of national 
economies through movements of goods, services, capital and labour (e.g. Stiglitz, 2006). The late 
20th century variety has been distinctive from earlier periods of globalization (e.g., late 19th century) 
in terms of its depth of functional integration, particularly through the rise of multinational 
enterprises and trade in intermediate goods. Almost all theoretical perspectives on globalisation 
acknowledge its impacts vary and that  “ǁŝŶŶĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ “ůŽƐĞƌƐ ? exist under globalization.  
Disagreements are centred around who the winners and losers are, if the  “ŐŽŽĚƐ ?ĞǆĐĞĞĚƚŚĞ
 “ďĂĚƐ ? ?and whether the losses are temporary or permanent (K ?ƌŝĞŶĂŶĚ>ĞŝĐŚĞŶŬŽ ? ? ? ? ? ?Dicken 
2015).  
The politics of globalization have been primarily informed by two influential theoretical 
frameworks. Proponents of globalization pointed to neoclassical trade theory, while its discontents 
embraced critical Marxian political economy. Much of classical and neoclassical trade theory ?Ɛ claims 
hinge upon the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage, that everybody could be better off when 
engaged with trade. Yet conventional trade theory also suggests that globalization could have 
uneven impacts on different groups. The Heckscher-Ohlin model, wherein differences in factor 
abundance are understood to drive trade, predicts that countries will specialise in the production of 
goods that most intensively use whatever factor of production they have in relative abundance. The 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem links this with distributional consequences, claiming that if trade 
liberalization increases the price of a product, it should increase the return to the factor used 
relatively intensively to produce it. Thus, distributional changes induced from North-South trade 
could broadly be expected to favour unskilled workers in the global South (given relative abundance 
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of unskilled labour), while disfavouring unskilled workers in the global North. While not everyone 
would win from market liberalization and economic integration, many have suggested that the 
benefits have far outweighed the comparatively small costs, and that the losers could be 
compensated (e.g. through transfer payments) (Krugman, 2008).  
Marxian political economic perspectives, particularly in the form of dependency and world 
systems theory, have been less sanguine about the consequences of globalization and the ability of 
states to simply compensate the losers. These theories emphasise how international economic 
integration fosters and perpetuates inequalities. Hans Singer (1950) and Raul Prebisch (1959) argued 
that international integration based on comparative advantage was biased against developing 
countries due to declining terms of trade. Such unequal exchange was even suggested to lead to the 
underdevelopment of the South (Frank 1969). From a world-systems viewpoint, globalization in the 
late 20th century was interpreted as yet another regime designed to entrench hierarchy between the 
core, semi-periphery and periphery (Wallerstein 1974). From this perspective globalization was tailor 
made to maintain and deepen the stark inequalities among differentially endowed countries.  
These two theoretical frameworks underpinned, to varying degrees, the politics of 
proponents and critics of economic globalization. The neo-classical trade theory perspective would 
suggest all countries should be in favour ŽĨƚƌĂĚĞ ?ĂŶĚ “ůŽƐĞƌƐ ?in the global North could be 
compensated by the state via welfare payments, while the global South would benefit from a 
growing pie. From the perspective of Marxian political economy, countries in the core were 
expected to benefit from international economic integration, while the dependency of developing 
countries would be entrenched. There were more nuanced positions, which Dicken (2015) refers to 
ĂƐ “ƐĐĞƉƚŝĐĂůŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĞĚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚŝĐ nature of the world-systems theory but 
also lamented the continued unevenness of the geo-economic map. In summary, the most vocal 
proponents and critics of late 20th century globalization staked out opposing positions that 
resonated strongly with either neoclassical trade theory or Marxian political economy. 
 
3. Twentieth century globalization and its discontents 
 
Proponents of global economic integration have long relied on (neo-) classical trade theory 
to argue that its benefits extend broadly across both the global North and global South. Bhagwati 
(2004) suggested that as well as lifting all boats, economic globalization also advanced social 
agendas, ranging from gender equality to reducing child labour. David Dollar and Aart Kraay 
produced evidence which, they claimed, showed that  “Őlobalization leads to faster growth and 
poverty reduction in poor countries ? ? ? ? ? ? ?& ? ? ? ?dŽĐŝƚĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ? ?ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐEďĞů
Laureates and 136 other influential economists issued an open letter to the American public in April 
2000, extolling the virtues of trade and explaining how allowing China into the WTO would benefit 
the US economy: 
 
 “ ?t ?Ğ ?ƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌƐŝŐŶĞĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝƐƚƐ ?ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĞŶƚƌǇ into the World Trade 
KƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĞŶƚƌǇǁŝůůƌĂŝƐĞůŝǀŝŶŐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŝŶďŽƚŚŚŝŶĂĂŶĚŝƚƐƚƌĂĚŝŶŐƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ?
By acceding to the WTO, China will open its borders to international competition, lock in and 
deepen its commitment to economic reform, and promote economic development and 
freedom ? ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚWƌĞƐƐ, 2000).  
 
Proponents dismissed potential losses within countries as inconsequential, because of the 
possibility that the losers could be compensated. In a case which garnered considerable debate, the 
United States witnessed a divergence of wages between skilled and unskilled workers in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Economists supporting globalization argued that this was a result of skill-biased 
technological change, rather than a result of international market liberalisation (Autor et al., 2016; 
Krugman, 2008). This reasoning was based on a number of factors - the long-standing decline in the 
share of US employment in manufacturing, the lack of close correlation in timing between rising 
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wage inequality and rising trade openness in developed countries, and substitution towards high-
skill workers occurring despite rising skill prices. It was assumed that displaced workers would either 
relocate or adapt to the job market by reskilling. As recently as 2008, the view that trade has little to 
ĚŽǁŝƚŚŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ/D& ? “ŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƌĂƌĞůǇƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ
ĨĂĐƚŽƌ ? ? ?ĂŵŽƌĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĨĂĐƚŽƌŝƐƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? -7) in driving wage declines among low-
skilled workers in the global EŽƌƚŚ ?tŚĞŶŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŝŵƉĂĐƚƐĂƌĞĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞĚin isolation, the IMF 
argued ƚŚĂƚ “the number of people who  ‘lose ? under globalization is likely to be outweighed by the 
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽ “ǁŝŶ ? ? ?/D& ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 Many critics, however, charged that late 20th century globalization would reproduce and 
even augment existing global uneven development. Building on the legacy of earlier movements 
such as that for a New International Economic Order, and with long-standing resistance to World 
Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes in the global South (e.g. Bello et al., 1982; Payer, 
1974), many critics were deeply concerned with the continued impoverishment of the global South. 
Critics cohered into a loose confederation of aligned groups, known alternatively as the anti- or 
alter-globalization movement, who most prominently came to public attention at the so-called 
 ‘ĂƚƚůĞŽĨ^ĞĂƚƚůĞ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞtdKDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝĂůŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶ ůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ? ?ZĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƐŝŶŐůĞĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚ
ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚŝƐǁĂƐĂ “ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?ƵƚƚĞůĂŶĚ'ŽƵůĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚŽƐĞ
diverse members opposed globalization for a range of reasons. They objected to such diverse issues 
as unchecked corporate power, the Washington Consensus, biopiracy, and structural adjustment, 
and were populated by activists, NGOs and organisations espousing a variety of concerns  W peace, 
climate change, conservation, indigenous rights, fair trade, debt relief, organised labour, anti-
sweatshops, and the AIDS pandemic. Star and Adams (2003) classified three broad groups 
advocating ĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨ ‘ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛŝůůs: radical reformists who sought to 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ğ ?Ő ?^ƚŝŐůŝƚǌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?Making Globalization Work), globalization 
from below who advocated the introduction of participatory global governance institutions (e.g. the 
tŽƌůĚ^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌƵŵ ?ĞůůŽ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?Deglobalization), and finally a third group who sought local 
autonomy from distant elites (e.g. Zapatistas, community currencies, the Mondragon experiment in 
Spain). These groups and approaches exhibited important differences, but they held in common the 
notion that globalization largely served the interests of the global North at the expense of those in 
the global South (Buttel and Gould, 2004; Clark and Themudo, 2006). 
 To the critics, the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which culminated with the creation 
of the WTO in 1994, was emblematic of globalization ?ƐĞǆĐĞƐƐĞƐ ? Economic globalization was widely 
seen as a means through which countries in the global North aggressively forced open markets in 
the global South (e.g. Oxfam, 2002). Bello, for example, claimed that the Uruguay Round 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ “the culminating point of a campaign of global economic containment of the legitimate 
aspirations to development on the ƉĂƌƚŽĨdŚŝƌĚtŽƌůĚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Stiglitz concurred, 
stating that since the end of the Cold War  “the advanced industrial countries actually created a 
global trade regime that helped their special corporate and financial interests, and hurt the poorest 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝǆ ? ?ƌŝƚŝĐƐƉŽŝŶƚĞĚƚŽways in which the largest economies wielded 
power at the World Bank and IMF (e.g. Wade, 2002), and to the consequences of their Washington 
Consensus structural adjustment programmes. As a result, ƚŚĞ “ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂůƐƉĂĐĞ ?ŽĨĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ
in the global South was seen to have been reduced by inhibiting the very trade and industrial policies 
that had been crucial to fostering growth of the Asian Tigers (Wade 2003). Furthermore, the policies 
recommended to developing countries by the World Bank and IMF (e.g. trade liberalisation, limited 
industrial policy) had little resemblance to the development strategies that had met with success in 
the advanced countries during their own industrialization (e.g. trade and industrial policies that 
ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚ ‘ŝŶĨĂŶƚ ?ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ ? ?ŚĂŶŐ, 2003). 
 Other critics dismissed claims that globalization served to improve human development 
indicators in the global South, and reduce poverty and inequality. Kaplinsky (2001, 48) suggested 
that there was little change in the absolute number of people living below $1 a day between 1987 
and 1998, and that, in fact, the number of people in poverty had grown in ƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘South 
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Asia ?,  ‘sub-Saharan Africa ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚCentral Asia ?. dŚŝƐǁĂƐŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚtĂĚĞ ?Ɛ
ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “ŐůŽďĂůŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŝƐǁŽƌƐĞŶŝŶŐƌĂƉŝĚůǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚǁĂƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ
by MilaŶŽǀŝĐ ?ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?ƐǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚůĞƐƐŐƌŽǁƚŚĂŶĚŝŶĐŽŵĞĐŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ
between rich and poor countries than the 1960s and 1970s (2003, 676). Wade (2004) also 
challenged the argument that ƚŚĂƚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŐůŽďĂů^ŽƵƚŚǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞ “ŐůŽďĂůŝƐĞƌƐ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ?
ŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƚŽŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚƌĂĚĞ ?ŚĂĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚŵŽƌĞƌĂƉŝĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŐƌŽǁƚŚƚŚĂŶ “ŶŽŶ-
ŐůŽďĂůŝƐĞƌƐ ?, whilst Stiglitz disputed claims that trade liberalisation would lead to more trade and 
growth, and that all boats would rise arguing that  “ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ ?ĐůĂŝŵ ?ŝƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ƚŚĞŽƌǇŶŽƌŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?).
 Perceptive critics also challenged the notion that globalization represented an unambiguous 
opportunity for rich countries. Kaplinsky (2001) noted that inequality was growing in the global 
North, with the combination of falling real incomes (e.g. in the Netherlands and US) and expanding 
economic activity fostering a pattern ŽĨ “ŝŵŵŝǌĞƌŝǌŝŶŐŐƌŽǁƚŚ ? ?^ƚŝŐůŝƚǌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂůƐŽǁŽƌƌŝĞĚƚŚĂƚ
 “globalization might be creating rich countries with poor people ? ?ƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐĞǆĂĐƚůǇ
what the Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicted. For the time being, however, these concerns over 
negative impacts within the North were drowned out, on the part of the right by the belief in skill-
biased technological change, and on the part of the left by the focus on the South within the alter-
globalization movement. Buttel and Gould (2004, 58-59), for example, claim that the alter-
ŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚǁĂƐ “ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇŽŶďĞŚĂůĨŽĨƚŚĞƉŽŽƌŝŶƚŚĞŐůŽďĂů^ŽƵƚŚ ? and 
exhibited an  “ŽǀĞƌƚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶƉŽǀĞƌƚǇŽǀĞƌEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ(ibid., 62). The anti-
/alter-globalization movement and those concerned with increasing poverty and inequality in the 
global North thus had less solidarity than might have been expected, with disagreements common 
over issues such as labour and the environment. This led Krugman (2000) to ůĂŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐ “Ă
sad irony that the cause that has finally awakened the long dormant American left is that of  W yes!  W 
denying opportunity to third-ǁŽƌůĚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?.  
 Indeed, despite the overtly left-wing character of much of the anti-/alter-globalization 
movement (Clark and Themudo, 2006, 57),  “ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůĞĨƚŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǁ
DŝůůĞŶŶŝƵŵ ? ?Buttel and Gould, 2004, 38), some nationalist and right-wing groups in Europe also 
opposed globalization over issues such as job losses and cultural identity (Milanovic, 2003, 668). 
Furthermore, Peter Evans drew on Karl Polanyi and perceptively observed thĂƚ “ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞĨŽƌŵƐ ?
of movements against globalization were not guaranteed, and that the emergence ŽĨ “ƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐĨŽƌƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? was a real possibility (2008, 281). Evans warned that:  
 
 “ ?Ƶ ?nless progressive movements for social protection succeed in addressing the failures of 
neo-liberalism, regressive movements are likely to contribute to a downward spiral of 
repression and anti-ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? (Evans, 2008, 286). 
 
More recently, however, a sea change in stances on economic globalization has occurred, 
including most prominently in the domestic politics of the US and UK has occurred. We refer to this 
ĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ďŝŐƐǁŝƚĐŚ ? ?ĂŶĚ in the next section we trace its origins and evolution. 
 
4. The  ?big sǁŝƚĐŚ ?: Northern backlash, yet Southern optimism 
 
Economic globalisation in the 21st century has evolved in ways that neither its extreme 
proponents nor its critics predicted. During the global financial crisis that began in 2008, The 
Economist  ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ƚhe integration of the world economy is in retreat on almost every 
ĨƌŽŶƚ ? ?World trade as a percentage of GDP fell considerably in 2009 (by 14%) and, by 2017, had still 
not recovered to its pre-crisis level. FDI inflows peaked at $1.90 trillion in 2007, and then fell 
considerably, only recovering to $1.76 trillion by 2015 (Kobrin, 2017, 161).  
The major backlash against late 20th century globalization, generated by the left and over 
the prospects for the global South, has now largely lost momentum. In some instances, countries 
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have sought to alter the terms in which they are integrated into the global economy (e.g. Bolivia, 
Venezuela, and Ecuador ? ?ǇĞƚĨŽƌŵĂŶǇ “ƚŚĞĞƵƉŚŽƌŝĐŽƉƚŝŵŝƐŵǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů
of global movements that was widespread at the end of thĞƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?ŝƐŚĂƌĚĞƌƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚĂ
ĚĞĐĂĚĞĂŶĚĂŚĂůĨůĂƚĞƌ ? ?ǀĂŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ, even sympathetic commentators have 
observed that the influence of the World Social Forum has relatively declined (Systemic Alternatives, 
2014).  
A very different backlash against globalization has instead been launched from the populist 
right in the global North. The h< ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŝŶ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ?ƚŽůĞĂǀĞƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ
was made amidst widespread expression of anti-globalist, anti-immigrant, and nationalist 
sentiments. Theresa May, Prime Minister of the UK, offered a sceptical assessment of globalization 
at the World Economic Forum in January 2017:  “[T]alk of greater globalization can make people 
fearful. For many, it means their jobs being outsourced and wages undercut. It means having to sit 
ďĂĐŬĂƐƚŚĞǇǁĂƚĐŚƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĐŚĂŶŐĞĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞŵ ? (World Economic Forum, 2017). Donald 
Trump was elected as the President of the United States by invoking economic ethno-nationalism, 
seeking to withdraw from trade agreements (calling the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)  “ƚŚĞǁŽƌƐƚƚƌĂĚĞĚĞĂůĞǀĞƌ ? ?, and to reinforce borders. The US has subsequently begun 
renegotiating NAFTA and has withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The Economist 
(2016) echoed the general mood by observing ƚŚĂƚ “ƵŶƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞĚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƐ of globalization by 
Western leaders feel as archaic as the self-indulgent guitar solos of hair metal past ? ?Media 
commentary by the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and the Washington Post in the US, and 
the Times of London, The Guardian, and the Financial Times in the UK, also demonstrates that the 
tone toward globalization has become more negative (Ghemawat 2017, 115). 
Scepticism toward globalization is not limited to the US and the UK, but extends to a number 
of European countries such as Hungary, Poland, France, Netherlands, Greece, and Spain. 
Considerable support has emerged for anti-globalization populists who espouse anti-immigrant and 
nationalistic messages (Rodrik, 2017a). Saval (2017) suggested that critics of globalization may have 
been: 
 
 “dismissed before because of their lack of economics training, or ignored because they were 
in distant countries, or kept out of sight by a wall of police, [but] their sudden political 
ascendancy in the rich countries of the west cannot be so easily discounted today ?. 
 
In a remarkable twist, China has now put itself forward as a leader of economic 
globalization. China has long been seen as a reluctant leader, ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĞŶŐyŝĂŽƉŝŶŐ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ
of taoguang yanghui, or keeping a low international profile while building up internal strength 
(Hopewell, 2015, 18). However, at the World Economic Forum in January 2017, Xi Jinping, the 
Chinese President, argued that globalization was not to blame for ƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐƉƌŽďůĞŵs. Defending 
the liberal economic order, Xi said that China was committed to make globalization work for 
everyone ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐĂƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ “ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŽĨŽƵƌƚŝŵĞƐ ?(Bolton, 2017). In another example of 
support for globalization from beyond the North ?^ŝŶŐĂƉŽƌĞ ?ƐKĨĨŝĐŝĂůŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽŶƚŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞ
Economy stated P “'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŐlobalization, we must not only resist 
protectionism but forge ahead to deepen linkages with our overseas partners and seek opportunities 
ŝŶŶĞǁŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?4). Thus, rather than a consensus that globalization is in crisis, leaders in East 
Asia remain committed to enhancing economic integration.  
Citizen surveys further reveal dramatic changes in attitudes to globalization across and 
within the global North and South. While such surveys have methodological limitations1, the results 
indicate distinctive trends that support the thesis ŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ďŝŐƐǁŝƚĐŚ ?. Among people in the global 
                                                          
1
 Many do not specify which aspect of globalization the respondent is being asked about (Bhagwati, 2004, 7). 
Also, they often mirror economic performance (Bhagwati, 2004, 10). Thus, it is difficult to know how 
representative international comparative citizen surveys are, and it is impossible to closely track how opinions 
have changed over longer time periods. 
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South, polls have consistently found quite positive attitudes towards globalization. In 2007, the 
Times of India claimed ƚŚĂƚ “/ŶĚŝĂŶƐďĞůŝĞǀĞŐlobalization benefits their country ? ?ĐŝƚŝŶŐĂƉŽůůďǇƚŚĞ
Chicago Council on Global Affairs and World Public Opinion that 54% of Indians answered  “ŐŽŽĚ ?
ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽ ? ?A? “ďĂĚ ?ƚŽƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĞƚŚĞƌincreasing economic connectionƐ “ǁith others 
around the world is mostly good or bad ? ?DŽƌĞƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ?^ƚŽŬĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚŽŶWĞǁZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ
Surveys from 2016 which found that 60% of Chinese ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞŝƌĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞŐůŽďĂů
economy is good (compared to 23% who think it is bad), while 52% of Indians surveyed thought it 
was good compared to 25% who said it was a problem. A recent YouGov survey of 20,000 people 
across 19 countries found a majority believed that globalization has been a force for good. That 
survey found the most enthusiasm for globalization in East and South-East Asia, where over 70% in 
all countries believed it has been a force for good. The highest approval, 91%, was in Vietnam, a 
relative latecomer to globalization (Smith 2017). 
By contrast, public support for globalization in the global North has plummeted. Bhagwati 
(2004) cited an Environics International Survey presented at the 2002 World Economic Forum 
Meetings to argue that disillusionment with globalization was not universal;  “ĂŶƚŝ-globalization 
sentiments are more prevalent in the rich countries of the North, while pluralities of policy makers 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŝŶƚŚĞƉŽŽƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚƐĞĞŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƐƚĞĂĚĂƐĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĨŽƌĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
8). Although Bhagwati suggesteĚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐĂŶ “ŝƌŽŶŝĐƌĞǀĞƌƐĂů ?, it proved to be in line with a 2007 BBC 
World Service poll that found 57% of people in G7 countries thought the pace of globalization was 
too rapid, whereas the majority of those in developing countries surveyed thought it was just right 
or too slow (e.g. IMF, 2008; Pieterse, 2012). A 2007 Pew Global Poll similarly found a decline in the 
percentage of people in many Northern countries who believed trade had a positive impact. In its 
analysis of the survey results, Kohut and Wilke commented that  “ŝƚŝƐŝŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂůůǇƐƚĂŐŶĂŶƚ
Western countries that we see the most ƚƌĞƉŝĚĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? (2008, 6-7). Almost ten 
years later, The Economist (2016) reported on a YouGov survey of 19 countries, which found that 
less than half of people in the US, UK and France believed that globalization ŝƐĂ “ĨŽƌĐĞĨŽƌŐŽŽĚ ?ŝŶ
the world. This broad change in attitude toward globalization is playing out in national electoral 
politics as well as gatherings such as the World Economic Forum and the meeting of the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation. 
 
5. dŚĞ ?ďŝŐƐǁŝƚĐŚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ geography of uneven development 
 
dŚĞ “ďŝŐƐǁŝƚĐŚ ?ƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇĐŽŶĨŽƵŶĚƐƚŚe predictions of the most vocal proponents and 
critics of globalization alike. Uneven development is dynamic and relates to differences both within 
and among countries (Sheppard, 2016). Naïve claims that the world is flat or that economic 
ŐůŽďĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐ “ǁŝŶ-ǁŝŶ ?ŚĂǀĞƌŝŐŚƚůǇďĞĞŶĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚ ?ĂůĚǁŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌƐŽŶĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Turok et al., 2017), yet it is also insufficient to suggest that globalization simply leads to a 
reproduction of existing inequalities, overlooking how that unevenness may be changing as a result 
of new macroeconomic geographies (Peck 2016). While trade theory could predict that there would 
be  ‘losers ? in the global North from international economic integration, proponents of economic 
globalization have asserted that they would be few in number and could be compensated. More 
recently, it appears that a large group of people feel more forsaken than compensated. Similarly, for 
those who embraced Marxian political economy, and warned of its negative consequences in the 
South, the apparent optimism and support for globalization in the South may have been unexpected. 
The sceptical internationalists (e.g. Evans, 2008; Kaplinsky, 2001; Stiglitz, 2006) should be 
acknowledged, however, for forecasting downsides in the global North. As we outline below, many 
people in the global North have experienced relative stagnation, whereas, albeit from a very low 
starting point and amidst considerable inequality, many people have experienced improved 
development outcomes in the global South. We then explore what ƚŚŝƐĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ “ďŝŐƐǁŝƚĐŚ ?ŵĂǇ
tell us about contemporary economic globalization. 
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5.1 The new geography of global uneven development 
Significant portions of the population in the US and other countries in the global North have 
experienced limited, if any, income gains in an era of globalization. DŝůĂŶŽǀŝĐ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? “elephant 
ŐƌĂƉŚ ? ?&ŝŐƵƌĞ1 below) has quickly become a popular way to demonstrate the relative stagnation 
experienced in North America and Europe in recent decades. Exploring changes in real incomes 
between 1988 and 2008, he showed that those who particularly lost out on any relative gain in 
income were the global upper middle class (those between the 75th and 90th percentiles on the 
global income distribution) and the poorest 5% of the world population. Of these least successful 
percentiles, 86% of the population were from mature economies in the global North (Lakner and 
Milanovic, 2015, 23). Considering these contrasts more widely, a growing body of evidence shows 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůEŽƌƚŚ ?ƐĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵǇŝƐƌĞĐĞĚŝŶŐ ?ǁŝƚŚ the share of high-income 
countries in global GDP having fallen from 76.8% in 2000 to 65.2% in 2015 (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. dŚĞ “ůĞƉŚĂŶƚŐƌĂƉŚ ? PZĞůĂƚŝǀĞŐĂŝŶŝŶƌĞĂůƉĞƌĐĂƉŝƚĂŝŶĐŽŵĞďǇŐůŽďĂůŝŶĐŽŵĞůĞǀĞů ? ? ? ? ?-
2008  
 
Source: Milanovic (2016, 11). 
Note: Gain in per capita income measured in 2005 international$. Gains were greatest at A (close to 
the 50% percentile) and C (the top 1%), but lowest at B (mostly comprised of rich world lower middle 
class). 
 
A different picture emerges in the global South. In Figure 1 above, it was Asians who 
comprised 90% of the population in the percentiles which did best in terms of relative income gains 
from 1988-2008 (Lakner and Milanovic, 2015, 23). The UNDP (2013, 43) has remarked that: 
 
 “ƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞworld scene in recent years is the transformation of many 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŝŶƚŽĚǇŶĂŵŝĐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĞƐ ?ĚŽŝŶŐǁĞůůŝŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŐƌŽǁƚŚĂŶĚƚƌĂĚĞ ?
they are collectively bolstering world economic growth, lifting other developing economies, 
reducing poverty and ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐǁĞĂůƚŚŽŶĂŐƌĂŶĚƐĐĂůĞ ? ?
 
The share of global GDP of low and middle-income countries increased from 22.5% in 2000 to 34.1% 
in 2015 (Figure 2 below). Much of this increase is accounted for by China, as well as India and Brazil. 
Their share of global GDP, only 4.6% in 1960, 6.6% in 1990 and 9.3% in 2000, had almost doubled in 
the 21st century to 18% by 2015.  
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Figure 2. Share of Global GDP (constant 2010 US$), 1990ʹ2015 
 
Source PƵƚŚŽƌƐ ?ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶďĂƐĞĚŽŶtŽƌůĚĂŶŬtŽƌůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ/ŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌƐ
(https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators).  
 
The development context of the global South has changed significantly since the turn of the 
Millennium, across a variety of important indicators. The total number of people in the world living 
on less than $1.90 per day (i.e. extreme poverty) has more than halved from 1.69 billion in 1999 to 
766 million in 2013. ƚůĞĂƐƚďǇŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ ?ƚŚĞ'ůŽďĂů^ŽƵƚŚ ?Ɛshare of population living in 
extreme poverty has fallen considerably this century. Whereas the percentage of the population in 
the global South with a daily consumption level of less than $1.90 was 38.2% in 1999, it was just 
13.4% in 20132. The percentage ŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚ by the World Bank as low-income, 
albeit quite a low threshold, more than halved within the first 15 years of the 21st century. 
Moreover, the total number of countries which are highly dependent on aid (having a net ODA > 9% 
of GNI) has fallen considerably, from 42 in 2000 to 29 in 2015, or from 34.1% to 23.2% of all low and 
middle-income countries with data available over that period3 (analysis of World Bank World 
Development Indicators). 
Considered overall, in comparison with the 1990s, the global South, in aggregate, now earns 
a much larger share of world GDP, has more middle-income countries, more middle-class people, 
less aid dependency, considerably greater life expectancy, and lower child and maternal mortality. 
Table 1 below provides some summary indicators for high-income countries (HICs) and low and 
middle-income countries (L&MICs), as somewhat imperfect approximations for global North and 
South.  
 
Table 1. Selected development indicators in 2000 and 2015, HIC and L&MIC comparisons 
 
 L&MICs: HICs: L&MICs: HICs: 
                                                          
2
 ŶĂůǇƐŝƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶtŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?ƐWŽǀĐĂůEĞƚ ?http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/home.aspx). 
3
 Analysis based on World Bank World Development Indicators. 
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2000 2000 2015 2015 
Share of global GDP (%, at market prices, 
constant 2010 US$) 
22.5 76.8 34.1 65.2 
% of HICs GNI per capita, PPP (constant 2011 
international $) 
15.3 100 20.7 100 
Life expectancy (years) 65.4 77.6 69.6 80.6 
Child (under 5) mortality rate (per 1,000 live 
births) 
85.2 10.7 47.3 6.8 
Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births) 376 12 237 10 
Sources: Data extracted from World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 
After ƚǁŽŚƵŶĚƌĞĚǇĞĂƌƐŽĨĂ “ĚŝǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ?ďŝŐƚŝŵĞ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ
countries following the Industrial Revolution (Pritchett, 1997), recent measurements suggest a 
change in the pattern of global inequality across a number of indicators (Horner and Hulme, 2017). 
The Global GINI of income distribution across all individuals in the world has fallen from 69.7 in 1988 
to 6 ? ? ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?tŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶĂůǇƐŝƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞtŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?Ɛ
Taking on Inequality (2016) suggests that, in 1998, 26% of global income inequality was related to 
differences within countries, with the remaining 74% relating to differences among countries. By 
2013, these shares were 35% and 65%. Two-hundred years of a great divergence between North and 
^ŽƵƚŚŶŽǁƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŚĂǀĞŚĂĚƐŽŵĞƌĞǀĞƌƐĂů ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŚĂůĨŽĨĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐŝŶĐŽŵĞĐĂŶ
be accounted for by the country where he/she lives or was born (Milanovic, 2013). Inter-country 
inequality, rather than intra-country inequality, is still dominant, but it accounts for a diminished 
share of income-based and other inequalities (World Bank, 2016). 
A new geography of global uneven development nevertheless involves contrasting standards 
of living and trajectories of change for many people in the global North and South. Piketty has 
suggested a further period of convergence between North and South (2014, 91), with intra-national 
inequalities projected to continue growing as a share of global inequality (2014, 59). Significant 
differentiation is present within the North and South. A chorus of analyses  W ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞK ?Ɛ
(2011) Divided We Stand  W have pointed out that income inequality in the Global North has rapidly 
increased in the 21st century, with growing income and wealth shares for the top 5%, top 1% and top 
0.1%. Growing unevenness has also been observed in the global South (UNDP 2013), with income 
inequality higher in many countries than in 1980 and a growing gap between the lowest 
consumption level people are surviving at and mean household consumption levels (Ravallion, 2014, 
2016).4 Enclaves of affluence (Sidaway, 2012), as well as many localised juxtapositions of wealth and 
poverty (Power, 2012) appear in both global North and South. While impacts vary, it has been found 
that countries that are more economically integrated with the rest of the world tend to have higher 
levels of regional inequality (Ezcurra and Rodriguez-Pose, 2013). Both the UK (Martin, 2015) and 
China (Dunford and Liu, 2017) have attracted particular recent attention for the extent of their 
ƐƉĂƚŝĂůƵŶĞǀĞŶŶĞƐƐ ?DĐĂŶŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŐůŽďĂůĨůĂƚƚĞŶŝŶŐĂŶĚůŽĐĂůƐƚĞĞƉĞŶŝŶŐĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ
particularly prescient. People in the global North and South have very different starting points, and 
trajectories, as part of this changing geography of global uneven development. 
 
 ? ? ? “dŚĞďŝŐƐǁŝƚĐŚ ?ĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŐůŽďĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƌĞǀŝƐŝƚĞĚ  
Given the observation that  “Őood times dampen anti-globalization attitudes, while bad times 
deepen them ? ?ŚĂŐǁĂƚŝ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐĞĞĂůƐŽŽůůĂƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŐƌŽǁŝŶŐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ
decline in the global North and optimism in the global South, have implications for attitudes and 
politics towards globalization. A Pew Research (2013) survey of 39 countries around the world found 
that people in North America, Europe and the Middle East tend to believe that their children will 
                                                          
4
 This is not the case for many Latin American countries, although they had extremely high levels of inequality 
in 1980. 
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have worse lives than they have, while the opposite is the case for Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin 
ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?DĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůEŽƌƚŚŚĂǀĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚĂƐŚŝĨƚĨƌŽŵ “an optimistic era of full 
employment, rising prosperity, and diminishing sŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚƐƉĂƚŝĂůŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?dƵƌŽŬĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽ
an era of unyielding crisis with uncertain career pathways and precarity (Standing, 2011). However, 
this does not necessarily shed light on what kind of backlash-induced retreat from economic 
globalization, or what kind of new form, may be supported. 
 Emerging evidence indicates that increased trade has played a role in economic stagnation 
or decline for people in the global North, especially in the US. Earlier evidence that dismissed the 
negative impact of trade was based on data from the 1980s and 1990s, before the significant 
expansion of imports into the US from lower wage nations and China in particular (Krugman, 2008). 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨĂǀŝĚƵƚŽƌĂŶĚĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?    ? ?ŚĂƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ŚŝŶĂƐŚŽĐŬ ?
has had major redistributive effects in the US. According to their estimates, import competition from 
China played a significant role in the decline of US manufacturing employment, accounting for a 
quarter of the fall between 1990 and 2007 (Autor et al., 2013). They have also estimated that 2.4 
million people in the US experienced employment reduction as a result of the growth of imports 
from China between 1999 and 2011 (Autor et al., 2016). Moreover, while technological change 
became more geographically dispersed, the loss of US manufacturing jobs has had a very uneven 
geography, with the costs disproportionately borne by trade-competing regions (e.g. counties in 
Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina and Indiana) (Autor et 
al., 2013a, 2013b, 2016). It has been found that while there have been increases in transfer 
payments (unemployment, disability, retirement, and healthcare) to regions of the US hardest hit by 
the trade shock, yet they fall far short of compensating for the income loss (Autor et al., 2013b, 
2016)5. 
dŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨƚŚĞ “ŚŝŶĂƐŚŽĐŬ ?ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚƐƚŚĞƌŽƐǇƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŵĂĚĞďǇĞŵŝŶĞŶƚ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝƐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŽƉĞŶůĞƚƚĞƌŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƉƌŝŽƌƚŽŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞtdK ?ƐĞĞĂďŽǀĞ ? ?/ƚŝƐƚŚƵƐ
not surprising that there is considerable public ambivalence about globalization in the US (Autor et 
Ăů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƐĐĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞƐƚŚĂƚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚƌĂĚĞůŝĨƚƐĂůůďŽĂƚƐŽƌƚŚĂƚ ‘ůŽƐĞƌƐ ?ǁŝůůďĞ
compensated. Some legislators have thus embraced protectionism (Feigenbaum and Hall, 2015), and 
decreases in incumbent party vote shares have been found for counties with high employment in 
low-ƐŬŝůůĞĚŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ ?dŚĞ “ŚŝŶĂƐŚŽĐŬ ?ŝƐ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ŶŽƚůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞh^ŝŶƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůEŽƌƚŚ ?
Workers in industries exposed to competition from Chinese exports have experienced considerable 
losses of earnings in the UK (Pessoa, 2016, for the period 2000-2007), Denmark (Ashournia et al., 
2014, for the period 1997-2008), Norway and Spain  ?ƵƚŽƌĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “sŽƚĞ>ĞĂǀĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞh<
has been shown to be correlated with regions hit by Chinese imports (Colantone and Stanig, 2016).  
However, in terms of influence on the global income distribution, it is difficult to separate 
economic globalization from skill-biased technological change as well as other factors (Milanovic, 
2016). National policy choices around taxation and transfers have played key roles in shaping 
inequality patterns within countries (Ravallion, 2017). /ŶƐƵĐŚĂĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? “ŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚ
as a scapegoat, in some instances invoked by cunning governments invoking external blame for 
internally-generated economic problems. The current backlash involving ethno-nationalist and anti-
immigrant components further complicates the picture, with voters in the global North supporting 
populist and protectionist politicians. 
The optimism in parts of the global South may paradoxically be a result of an earlier 
rejection of neoliberal globalization, at least in its Washington Consensus form. As noted by Rodrik 
(2006), the success of late developers appears to bear little relationship to the neoliberal vision of 
ƚŚĞŝƌďĞŝŶŐƉĂƐƐŝǀĞůǇ “ůŝĨƚĞĚŽƵƚŽĨƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ ?ďǇĨĂĐƚŽƌƉƌŝĐĞĐŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ?ŚŝŶĂ ?ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ŚĂƐŶŽƚ
followed an idealised Washington Consensus approach to economic globalization. One result of this 
ŐƌŽǁƚŚĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŝƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?ĂƐŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞŐůŽďĂů^ŽƵƚŚŝƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇ “ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ
                                                          
5
 Autor et al. found that the increase in transfer income to US households at the 75
th
 percentile of trade 
exposure ($58), only fractionally offset the earnings loss of $549 in annual household wage and salary (2016, 
231). 
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ƚŚĞŐƌĂƐƉŽĨtĞƐƚĞƌŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?WŝĞƚĞƌƐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Many countries in the global South are now 
participating in a globalization which is more multipolar (Horner and Nadvi, 2017). China, India and 
Brazil have become key players at the WTO (Hopewell, 2015). The New Development Bank was 
founded by the BRICS in 2014 and is headquartered in Shanghai. The Chinese-initiated Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank was launched in January 2016. Some human development trends 
may even be driven by a counter-movement to neoliberal globalization, such as the expansion of 
social protection policies in parts of the global South (Ferguson, 2015; Harris and Scully, 2015).  
The extent to which the US, in particular, and other countries in the global North will seek to 
retreat from, or reform, globalisation remains to be seen. On the one hand, it is unclear whether 
globalization is being altogether rejected in some parts of the global North or whether the current 
backlash may largely relate to controls on labour migration. Both the UK exit from the EU, in 
particular, as well as potentially the renegotiated NAFTA, do imply changes to trade relationships. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to predict how opinions in the global South may shift over time. 
Although Xi Jinping has stated that China will play a leadership role in economic globalization, it is 
unclear whether the Chinese state is actually willing or able to assume the burden this entails (Pettis, 
2016). Indeed, even if it does, the form of globalization is likely to be very different from that 
ĞŶǀŝƐŝŽŶĞĚďǇŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽŶĞŶƚƐĂƚƚŚĞƚƵƌŶŽĨƚŚĞDŝůůĞŶŶŝƵŵ ?>ŝƵĂŶĚƵŶĨŽƌĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Thus, it may be more appropriate to debate the nature, rather than the end, of globalization. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 KƵƌĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŚĞƐŝƐŝƐƚŚĂƚĂ ‘ďŝŐƐǁŝƚĐŚ ?ŚĂƐƚĂŬĞŶƉůĂĐĞƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƚƵƌŶŽĨƚŚĞDŝůůĞŶŶŝƵŵǁŝƚŚ
regard to the politics of globalization. The North was seen as the architect and driver of globalization 
at the turn of the Millennium, as well the main beneficiary of increased economic integration. The 
critics of globalization, including the anti- ?ĂůƚĞƌŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ĂƚƚůĞ
ŽĨ^ĞĂƚƚůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞtŽƌůĚ^ŽĐŝĂů&orum, were mostly associated with the political left, and argued 
that globalization rendered the global South dependent and reduced its autonomy. However, as we 
approach 2020, a right-wing populist nationalist backlash against globalization has erupted on the 
ǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐƐƚĂŐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůEŽƌƚŚ ?dŚŝƐEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶƉŽƉƵůŝƐƚďĂĐŬůĂƐŚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞƐŝŶŐůĞŵŽƐƚ
significant challenge to globalization in the 21st century, yet the notion that globalization is in crisis is 
far from universal. Ironically, citizens in many countries in the global South now express support for 
 “ŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ďƌŽĂĚůǇŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚ ?ǁŚŝůĞChina has asserted a desire to play a global leadership 
role. 
dŚĞ “ďŝŐƐǁŝƚĐŚ ?ĨƌŽŵ^ŽƵƚŚ-left to North-right can be situated within a new geography of 
uneven development which has a more fine-grained footprint at the individual, industry, city, and 
regional level. The Northern working and middle classes and some of the extreme poor in the global 
South appear to be losing vis-à-vis other groups, albeit from very different starting points. At a time 
when there are more poor people in rich countries and more poor countries with rich people, global 
inequality is increasingly manifested within territorial proximity. Such a reorientation challenges 
both the mutual benefit claims of many trade theorists, as well as the viewpoint of those Marxian 
political economists who suggested economic globalization would reproduce existing inequalities. 
While the most vocal claims of neither the proponents nor the critics of 20th century globalization 
ŚĂǀĞƉůĂǇĞĚŽƵƚ ?ƚŚĞ “ƐĐĞƉƚŝĐĂůŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƐ ?ǁĞƌĞĂƌŐƵĂďůǇƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞŵŽƌĞ
nuanced patterns of winning and losing in an era of economic globalization. A major lesson is thus to 
be wary of both wholesale attacks on, and wide-ranging defences of, 21st century globalization. In 
light of the difficulties ŝŶĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “ůŽƐĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚĂŶĚ “ůŽƐĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ
South, the challenge of our times, as intimated by Paul Krugman in the opening quote, is for an alter-
globalization movement which addresses both (Rodrik, 2017b). Neither the earlier era in which a 
vast gulf between prosperity and poverty was defined by national and continental boundaries, nor 
the 21st century situation where prosperity and poverty are increasingly juxtaposed is desirable. 
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